

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA

Dashod Reed,

Plaintiff

v.

Julie Williams,

Defendant

Case No. 2:23-cv-00858-CDS-EJY

**Order Dismissing and
Closing Case**

Pro se plaintiff Dashod Reed brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at High Desert State Prison. ECF No. 1-1. After initiating this case, Reed filed a notice indicating that he was no longer incarcerated and providing the Court with his current address. On January 24, 2024, this court ordered denied Reed's application to proceed *in forma pauperis* for prisoners and directed Reed to file a fully complete application to proceed *in forma pauperis* for non-prisoners or pay the full \$402 filing fee on or before February 29, 2024. ECF No. 6. The court warned Reed that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file a fully complete application to proceed *in forma pauperis* for non-prisoners or pay the full \$402 filing fee for a civil action by that deadline. *Id.* at 1. That deadline expired and Reed did not file a fully complete application to proceed *in forma pauperis* for non-prisoners, pay the full \$402 filing fee, or otherwise respond.

I. Discussion

District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. *Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles*, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party's failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. *See Carey v. King*, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring *pro se* plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); *Malone v. U.S. Postal Service*, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether

1 to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the court must consider: (1) the public's interest in
2 expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of
3 prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and
4 (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. *See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.*, 460 F.3d
5 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting *Malone*, 833 F.2d at 130).

6 The first two factors, the public's interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and
7 the court's interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Reed's claims. The third
8 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of
9 injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or
10 prosecuting an action. *See Anderson v. Air West*, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth
11 factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by
12 the factors favoring dismissal.

13 The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to
14 correct the party's failure that brought about the need to consider dismissal. *See Yourish v. Cal.*
15 *Amplifier*, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives
16 *before* the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); *accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza*,
17 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of
18 dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.”
19 *Henderson v. Duncan*, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this court cannot operate without
20 collecting reasonable fees, and litigation cannot progress without a plaintiff's compliance with
21 court orders, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But issuing a
22 second order will only delay the inevitable and further squander the court's finite resources.
23 Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth
24 factor favors dismissal. Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they
25 weigh in favor of dismissal.

26 II. Conclusion

27 It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on Reed's
28 failure to file a fully complete application to proceed *in forma pauperis* for non-prisoners or pay the

1 full \$402 filing fee in compliance with this court's January 24, 2024, order. The Clerk of Court is
2 directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be filed in
3 this now-closed case. If Reed wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case
4 and either pay the required filing fee or properly apply for *in forma pauperis* status.

5 Dated: May 8, 2024

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8 Cristina D. Silva
9 United States District Judge
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